Update Teamviewer to version 15.59.5
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CVE Vulnerabilities for Teamviewer
| CVE | Published | Severity | Details | Exploitability | Impact | Vector |
| CVE‑2024‑6053 | 2024‑08‑28 17:15:11 | MEDIUM (4) | Improper access control in the clipboard synchronization feature in TeamViewer Full Client prior version 15.57 and TeamViewer Meeting prior version 15.55.3 can lead to unintentional sharing of the clipboard with the current presenter of a meeting. | 3 | 1 | NETWORK |
| CVE‑2022‑23242 | 2022‑03‑23 16:15:08 | MEDIUM (4) | TeamViewer Linux versions before 15.28 do not properly execute a deletion command for the connection password in case of a process crash. Knowledge of the crash event and the TeamViewer ID as well as either possession of the pre-crash connection password or local authenticated access to the machine would have allowed to establish a remote connection by reusing the not properly deleted connection password. | 1 | 4 | LOCAL |
| CVE‑2021‑35005 | 2022‑01‑24 18:15:08 | LOW (3) | This vulnerability allows local attackers to disclose sensitive information on affected installations of TeamViewer. An attacker must first obtain the ability to execute low-privileged code on the target system in order to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists within the TeamViewer service. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of user-supplied data, which can result in a read past the end of an allocated array. An attacker can leverage this in conjunction with other vulnerabilities to execute arbitrary code in the context of SYSTEM. Was ZDI-CAN-13818. | 2 | 1 | LOCAL |
| CVE‑2021‑34859 | 2021‑10‑25 17:15:08 | HIGH (9) | This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of TeamViewer 15.16.8.0. User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must visit a malicious page or open a malicious file. The specific flaw exists within the parsing of TVS files. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of user-supplied data, which can result in a memory corruption condition. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the current process. Was ZDI-CAN-13697. | 3 | 6 | NETWORK |
| CVE‑2021‑34858 | 2022‑01‑13 22:15:09 | HIGH (8) | This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of TeamViewer. User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must visit a malicious page or open a malicious file. The specific flaw exists within the parsing of TVS files. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of user-supplied data, which can result in a read past the end of an allocated structure. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the current process. Was ZDI-CAN-13606. | 2 | 6 | LOCAL |
| CVE‑2021‑34803 | 2021‑06‑16 15:15:09 | HIGH (8) | TeamViewer before 14.7.48644 on Windows loads untrusted DLLs in certain situations. | 2 | 6 | LOCAL |
| CVE‑2020‑13699 | 2020‑07‑29 16:15:12 | HIGH (9) | TeamViewer Desktop for Windows before 15.8.3 does not properly quote its custom URI handlers. A malicious website could launch TeamViewer with arbitrary parameters, as demonstrated by a teamviewer10: --play URL. An attacker could force a victim to send an NTLM authentication request and either relay the request or capture the hash for offline password cracking. This affects teamviewer10, teamviewer8, teamviewerapi, tvchat1, tvcontrol1, tvfiletransfer1, tvjoinv8, tvpresent1, tvsendfile1, tvsqcustomer1, tvsqsupport1, tvvideocall1, and tvvpn1. The issue is fixed in 8.0.258861, 9.0.258860, 10.0.258873, 11.0.258870, 12.0.258869, 13.2.36220, 14.2.56676, 14.7.48350, and 15.8.3. | 3 | 6 | NETWORK |
| CVE‑2019‑19362 | 2019‑12‑02 03:15:11 | MEDIUM (7) | An issue was discovered in the Chat functionality of the TeamViewer desktop application 14.3.4730 on Windows. (The vendor states that it was later fixed.) Upon login, every communication is saved within Windows main memory. When a user logs out or deletes conversation history (but does not exit the application), this data is not wiped from main memory, and therefore could be read by a local user with the same or greater privileges. | 3 | 4 | NETWORK |
| CVE‑2019‑18988 | 2020‑02‑07 16:15:10 | HIGH (7) | TeamViewer Desktop through 14.7.1965 allows a bypass of remote-login access control because the same key is used for different customers' installations. It used a shared AES key for all installations since at least as far back as v7.0.43148, and used it for at least OptionsPasswordAES in the current version of the product. If an attacker were to know this key, they could decrypt protect information stored in the registry or configuration files of TeamViewer. With versions before v9.x , this allowed for attackers to decrypt the Unattended Access password to the system (which allows for remote login to the system as well as headless file browsing). The latest version still uses the same key for OptionPasswordAES but appears to have changed how the Unattended Access password is stored. While in most cases an attacker requires an existing session on a system, if the registry/configuration keys were stored off of the machine (such as in a file share or online), an attacker could then decrypt the required password to login to the system. | 1 | 6 | LOCAL |
| CVE‑2019‑18251 | 2019‑11‑26 00:15:12 | HIGH (9) | In Omron CX-Supervisor, Versions 3.5 (12) and prior, Omron CX-Supervisor ships with Teamviewer Version 5.0.8703 QS. This version of Teamviewer is vulnerable to an obsolete function vulnerability requiring user interaction to exploit. | 3 | 6 | NETWORK |
| CVE‑2019‑18196 | 2019‑10‑24 16:15:20 | MEDIUM (7) | A DLL side loading vulnerability in the Windows Service in TeamViewer versions up to 11.0.133222 (fixed in 11.0.214397), 12.0.181268 (fixed in 12.0.214399), 13.2.36215 (fixed in 13.2.36216), and 14.6.4835 (fixed in 14.7.1965) on Windows could allow an attacker to perform code execution on a target system via a service restart where the DLL was previously installed with administrative privileges. Exploitation requires that an attacker be able to create a new file in the TeamViewer application directory; directory permissions restrict that by default. | 1 | 6 | LOCAL |
| CVE‑2019‑11769 | 2019‑09‑11 20:15:10 | HIGH (8) | An issue was discovered in TeamViewer 14.2.2558. Updating the product as a non-administrative user requires entering administrative credentials into the GUI. Subsequently, these credentials are processed in Teamviewer.exe, which allows any application running in the same non-administrative user context to intercept them in cleartext within process memory. By using this technique, a local attacker is able to obtain administrative credentials in order to elevate privileges. This vulnerability can be exploited by injecting code into Teamviewer.exe which intercepts calls to GetWindowTextW and logs the processed credentials. | 2 | 6 | LOCAL |
| CVE‑2018‑16550 | 2018‑09‑05 22:29:00 | MEDIUM (5) | TeamViewer 10.x through 13.x allows remote attackers to bypass the brute-force authentication protection mechanism by skipping the "Cancel" step, which makes it easier to determine the correct value of the default 4-digit PIN. | 0 | 0 | NETWORK |
| CVE‑2018‑14333 | 2018‑07‑17 02:29:00 | MEDIUM (4) | TeamViewer through 13.1.1548 stores a password in Unicode format within TeamViewer.exe process memory between "[00 88] and "[00 00 00]" delimiters, which might make it easier for attackers to obtain sensitive information by leveraging an unattended workstation on which TeamViewer has disconnected but remains running. | 0 | 0 | NETWORK |
| CVE‑2010‑3128 | 2010‑08‑26 18:36:36 | HIGH (9) | Untrusted search path vulnerability in TeamViewer 5.0.8703 and earlier allows local users, and possibly remote attackers, to execute arbitrary code and conduct DLL hijacking attacks via a Trojan horse dwmapi.dll that is located in the same folder as a .tvs or .tvc file. | 0 | 0 | NETWORK |
Get the IT stuff done that nobody wants to do.
Patch more applications, achieve compliance, and prevent problems while reducing stress with Lavawall®.
Security First
A security tool by security auditors. From Passkeys and Argon2i to source validation and MVSP principles, Lavawall® has you covered.
Constant Improvement
More features and more security added nearly every day.
More patchable programs added every week
While Ninite and other patching tools have had the same patch offerings for decades, we're monitoring stats to keep adding the most useful prorgams.
Details matter
From wrapping TLS communications in extra encryption and uninstalling remote support tools when they aren't used to detailed statistical analysis of system and network performance, Lavawall® goes in-depth.
Chromium extensions and Notification Validation
Lavawall®p; goes beyond patches and breach detection. We also monitor for risky Chromium extensions and allowed notifications that might be part of a phishing or ransomware attack.
Extended Cloud Security
Extend the security features of Cloudflare, Microsoft, Google, Sophos, and other cloud providers to create a Lavawall® of protection
Secure Remote Management
Even if you used breached remote management tools like ScreenConnect through Lavawall® when it was vulnerable, your computers stayed safe because we only install the agent when it needs to be used.
Integrations and automation
Easily deploy, monitor, and analyze security tools like Huntress, AutoElevate, and Sophos. Magically gain details from ZenDesk, ConnectWise, Datto, Panorama9, Microsoft, and Google.
Human and automated support
Get immediate fixes, user notifications, admin notifications -- and even security-certified human level 3 support when our advanced statistical analysis confirms a problem or anomaly.
We are constantly improving the Lavawall® tools to add more value. Some of our most recent changes include:
| 2024‑10‑30 | 0.12.8.195 | Mac update refinements |
| 2024‑10‑25 | 0.12.3.190 | |
| 2024‑10‑21 | 0.12.0.187 | Macos implementaiton, linux and windows improvements |
| 2024‑10‑16 | 0.11.128.186 | Linux stats and system information improvements, improvements for application shutdown |
| 2024‑09‑12 | 0.11.113.171 | CPU Optimizations and Packages reliability improvements |
| 2024‑09‑05 | 0.11.106.164 | Phased deployment enhancements |
| 2024‑09‑04 | 0.11.103.161 | |
| 2024‑09‑02 | 0.11.102.160 | CPU Optimizations and Packages reliability improvements |
| 2024‑08‑30 | 0.11.99.157 | CPU Optimizations and Packages reliability improvements |
| 2024‑08‑29 | 0.11.98.156 | CPU utilization and console event optimization |
| 2024‑08‑28 | 0.11.97.155 | Reliability to detect unusual updates like redistributables. |
| 2024‑08‑27 | 0.11.96.154 | |
| 2024‑08‑26 | 0.11.95.153 | Faster response for reboot requests |
| 2024‑08‑20 | 0.11.92.150 | Additional package upgrade pre-requisites |
| 2024‑08‑15 | 0.11.89.147 | |
| 2024‑08‑06 | 0.11.87.145 | |
| 2024‑07‑26 | 0.11.83.141 | Add resiliency for MAC duplicates and uptime |
| 2024‑07‑25 | 0.11.82.140 | Changes to facilitate cross-platform use. Bitlocker and Windows key refinements |
| 2024‑07‑15 | 0.11.80.138 | Antivirus and temperature added to configuration checks |
| 2024‑07‑15 | 0.11.79.137 | Add configuration checks for execution policy and secure boot |
| 2024‑07‑11 | 0.11.77.135 | load balancing refinements |
| 2024‑07‑10 | 0.11.76.134 | Add additional load balancing and data residency capabilities, add randomness to recurring task timings to decrease server load |
| 2024‑07‑05 | 0.11.74.132 | changes to graph and residual work on user imporsonation |
| 2024‑07‑04 | 0.11.73.131 | Add configuration checks for execution policy and secure boot. |
| 2024‑07‑03 | 0.11.72.130 | Enhanced event log monitoring |
| 2024‑07‑02 | 0.11.71.129 | Add details to Windows updates, enhanced risk metrics for application patches |
| 2024‑06‑19 | 0.11.65.123 | Update resiliancy and garbage collection |
| 2024‑06‑13 | 0.11.60.118 | Enhanced logging |
| 2024‑06‑12 | 0.11.55.113 | Include the primary drive serial number; MAC addresses for built-in wireless, Bluetooth, and ethernet into the device hash to restore uninstalled and reinstalled devices in cases where the motherboard serial is not unique |
| 2024‑06‑07 | 0.11.54.112 | Patch and package uninstall data addition |
| 2024‑06‑05 | 0.11.47.105 | refine per-user registry application listing |
| 2024‑06‑02 | 0.11.45.103 | uninstall and reinstall refinements, refine local logging, refine self-update and uninstall timing |
| 2024‑05‑30 | 0.11.21.79 | various bug fixes and improvements |
| 2024‑05‑28 | 0.11.16.74 | Error logging, registration, and uninstall improvements. |
| 2024‑05‑24 | 0.11.14.72 | applied changes for devices and login commands, changes for registration as well |
| 2024‑05‑22 | 0.11.13.71 | Add Windows computer model, improve Operating System parsing |
| 2024‑05‑21 | 0.11.11.69 | Added additional states for Windows update, flexibility for non-standard program file configurations, support for network diagrams at the switch level, details for Windows editions |
| 2024‑05‑21 | 0.11.10.68 | Add specific cases for Defender patterns and Composer versions. |
| 2024‑05‑17 | 0.11.3.61 | Change Log storage location to c:\program files\Lavawall |
| 2024‑05‑17 | 0.11.1.59 | self-update improvements. |
| 2024‑05‑16 | 0.8.0.55 | error log reporting and management. |
| 2024‑05‑15 | 0.7.0.54 | Websocket resiliency improvements |
| 2024‑05‑09 | 0.6.0.53 | Error log reporting and management. |
| 2024‑05‑01 | 0.5.44.52 | Even more improvements to scheduler |
| 2024‑04‑24 | 0.5.41.49 | Install compatibility with Sandbox |
| 2024‑04‑22 | 0.5.21.29 | Project property changes to enable automated compilation with new features. |
| 2024‑04‑20 | 0.5.20.28 | Add motherboard serial number and company reassignment |
| 2024‑04‑11 | 0.5.4.12 | Automate release notes as part of build process |
| 2024‑04‑03 | 0.5.3.11 | Websocket and service enhancements |
| 2024‑03‑21 | 0.5.2.10 | Enhance zip file validation |
Although the Linux agent code base is mature, dating back to 2006, we're still constantly improving it to add value and compatibility for new distributions. Some of our most recent changes include:
| 2024‑05‑20 | 253 | Added cleanup of old .json files during a re-install |
| 2024‑05‑13 | 252 | Added apt-get update to install |
| 2024‑05‑06 | 248 | Allow restart to use /var/run/reboot-required if needrestart is not installed |
| 2024‑04‑22 | 239 | Improve internal update and version tracking |
| 2024‑04‑15 | 235 | Add support for Yum packages |
| 2024‑04‑08 | 233 | Align patching with Windows patch reporting |
| 2024‑04‑02 | 228 | Add support for needrestart |
| 2024‑03‑04 | 224 | Schedule restarts |
| 2024‑03‑25 | 221 | Add support for apt packages |
| 2024‑03‑18 | 212 | Implement release management |
| 2024‑03‑11 | 202 | Add user login monitoring |
| 2024‑03‑04 | 189 | Enhance installation reliability |
| 2024‑02‑26 | 187 | Exapand triggers to identify if the instance needs to be restarted |
| 2024‑02‑19 | 146 | Improve compatibility for non-AWS instances |
| 2024‑02‑14 | 138 | Add self-uninstall capabilities |
| 2024‑02‑12 | 135 | Enhance scheduling flexibility |
| 2024‑02‑07 | 132 | Add kernel version tracking |
| 2024‑02‑05 | 124 | Add device hash to cryptographic self-update script validation |
| 2024‑01‑29 | 107 | Enhance encryption of patch data |
| 2024‑01‑22 | 98 | Improve how available storage is calculated |
| 2024‑01‑15 | 97 | Move initial tasks from installation file to sub scripts |
| 2024‑05‑21 | 91 | Improve multi-distribution compatibility |
| 2024‑05‑21 | 79 | Improve encryption reliability |
| 2023‑12‑11 | 68 | Enhance cryptographic validation of new scripts before updating |
| 2023‑11‑20 | 62 | Add inner layer of AES encryption in case TLS inspection doesn't allow for a secure connection |
| 2023‑11‑27 | 56 | Additional base cases for resiliancy |
| 2023‑11‑20 | 54 | Additional headers added to authentication process during installation. |
| 2023‑11‑20 | 53 | Enhanced key management |
| 2023‑11‑15 | 51 | Add insecure installation parameter to allow installation in environments with TLS inspection or other machine-in-the-middle situations. |
| 2023‑11‑06 | 42 | Enhance redundant encryption during installation. |
| 2023‑10‑30 | 33 | Improve install-over compatibility |
| 2023‑10‑23 | 18 | Add reboot configuration and scheduling |
| 2023‑10‑23 | 17 | Add self-updating functionality. |
| 2023‑10‑16 | 15 | Add Linux patching information for apt |
| 2023‑10‑09 | 14 | Collect system information |
| 2023‑10‑09 | 13 | Add Linux distribution information |
| 2023‑09‑30 | 12 | Add memory monitoring |
| 2023‑09‑30 | 10 | Add hardware information |
| 2023‑09‑23 | 9 | Add AWS information |
| 2023‑09‑23 | 8 | Add customized schedule capability for configuration updates |
| 2023‑09‑23 | 7 | Add support for package monitoring using package and dpkg logs |
| 2023‑09‑16 | 6 | Add storage data configuration gathering |
| 2023‑09‑16 | 5 | Add CPU information |
Lavawall®'s data gathering approach started with Government and Fortune 50 information security audits. When our founder transitioned from audit and assurance work to a Managed IT Service Provider (MSP), he was shocked that basics like Multi-Factor Authentication were painful to implement in some RMMs like ConnectWise and it was impossible to turn off remote access services in others like Datto RMM and SuperOps.
Lavawall® was built from the ground up with these concerns and the Minimum Viable Secure Product requirements in mind.
Some of the controls we implemented include:
Lavawall® was built from the ground up with these concerns and the Minimum Viable Secure Product requirements in mind.
Some of the controls we implemented include:
- PassKeys as the preferred primary authentication at no additional cost
- Single Sign-on using modern, maintained, and industry-standard protocols for all customers at no additional cost
- Multi-Factor Authentication as a non-negotiable default
- Encrypting communications the same way as TLS again within the TLS tunnel, so we can allow TLS inspection without breaking like Huntress or disclosing security vulnerabilities to eavesdroppers.
- Encouraging external vulnerability reports and customer testing
- Passwords checked against popular disclosed passwords, hashed before they leave your computer, and then stored using Argon2id
- Not requiring the use of passwords at all. We consider them a temporary backup authentication in case you can't use passkeys or SSO.
Lavawall® scanning computers are on dedicated servers in Calgary, Alberta, Canada.
Lavawall® databases and front-end systems are hosted with AWS in Montréal, Québec, Canada.
We send emails through AWS in Ireland and dedicated servers in Calgary, Alberta, Canada.
We send text messages for additional identity verification through Twilio in the United States.
We store executables and pass requests through Cloudflare at your nearest edge location.
We use Cloudflare for risk management, turnstile, and web application firewall services.
We use LeadPages for landing pages.
We use Google and Facebook for analytics on our public-facing pages, but they do not have access to the console.
We integrate with third-party tools, such as Microsoft, Google, Huntress, Screen Connect, Axcient, and Datto in their respective locations. However, you must initiate these integrations through single sign-on or by enabling them in your Lavawall® console.
Lavawall® databases and front-end systems are hosted with AWS in Montréal, Québec, Canada.
We send emails through AWS in Ireland and dedicated servers in Calgary, Alberta, Canada.
We send text messages for additional identity verification through Twilio in the United States.
We store executables and pass requests through Cloudflare at your nearest edge location.
We use Cloudflare for risk management, turnstile, and web application firewall services.
We use LeadPages for landing pages.
We use Google and Facebook for analytics on our public-facing pages, but they do not have access to the console.
We integrate with third-party tools, such as Microsoft, Google, Huntress, Screen Connect, Axcient, and Datto in their respective locations. However, you must initiate these integrations through single sign-on or by enabling them in your Lavawall® console.
Active security by design
Lavawall® is under active development with the latest release on
5+
Interfaces
150+
Monitored Applications
7+
System Metrics
Actively manage your IT with Lavawall®
Patching
Updates Beyond Windows
Lavawall® prevents the 80% of breaches and failed audits due to missing patches and updates.
You can reduce application patching delays from 67 days to nearly immediate with the 150+ applications that Lavawall® monitors and patches.
Patch release monitoring
Monitor everything without having to select packages or “managed applications”
Patch impact classification
Standard and optional Windows patches
The above listing includes products that Lavawall® monitors through public information and/or proprietary statistical analysis.
Although we do have a partner relationship with some of the listed products and companies, they do not necessarily endorse Lavawall® or have integrations with our systems.
Learn More
Flexible Term; Flexible Service
Flexibility for your dynamic business
You need to get your arms around compliance and security and don't want to get locked into “high watermark” monthly invoices or multi-year contracts.
Pay-as-you-need monthly pricing
DIY, full management, and coaching options
CMMI, PCI, SOC2, Canadian Cybersecurity, Minimum Viable Secure Product, and other compliance support
Choose the plan that's right for you
Simple pricing. No hidden fees. Advanced features for you business.
Month
Annual
Get 2 months free with Annual!
DIY
Security-focused RMM
C$3.25 /computer/Month
C$32.50 /computer/Year
-
1 computer
or 1 of the following cloud integrations:
AWS, Axcient, Connectwise, Datto, Google, Huntress, M365, Sophos Central integrations
(each integration counts as 1 computer) -
150+ application patches
-
30-day Logs
-
Security configuration monitoring
-
Anomaly detection
-
CMMI, MVSP, CyberCanda compliance
-
Lavawall® support
-
Sophos MDR: C$13.50/desktopSophos MDR: C$162/desktop
-
Huntress: C$5.40/deviceHuntress: C$64.80/device
-
Available white-label support for end users
-
Level 3+ IT support for IT
-
Weekly IT coaching sessions
Popular
Managed Security & Support
Unlimited end-user support
C$160 /user/Month
C$1,600 /user/Year
-
1 computer/user
Additional devices charged at DIY prices -
AWS, Axcient, Connectwise, Datto, Google, Huntress, M365, Sophos Central integrations
-
150+ application patches
-
90-day Logs
-
Security configuration monitoring
-
Anomaly detection
-
CMMI, MVSP, CyberCanda compliance
-
Lavawall® support
-
Sophos MDR Essentials
-
Huntress
-
White-label email and phone support for end users
-
Level 3+ IT support for IT
-
Weekly IT coaching sessions
-
Automatic discount and upgrade to Support & Coaching after 15 users
Support & Coaching
Improve your IT performance
$2,250 /Month
$22,500 /Year
-
25 computers included
Additional computers charged at DIY prices -
AWS, Axcient, Connectwise, Datto, Google, Huntress, M365, Sophos Central integrations
-
150+ application patches
-
90-day Logs
-
Security configuration monitoring
-
Anomaly detection
-
CMMI, MVSP, CyberCanda compliance
-
Lavawall®-only support
-
Sophos MDR Essentials
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Huntress
-
White-label email and phone support for 15 users included Additional: C$150/user Additional: C$1,500/user
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L3 IT support for IT
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Weekly IT coaching sessions
Frequently Asked Questions
If you can not find answer to your question in our FAQ, you can always contact us or email us. We will answer you shortly!
General Questions
The three big catalysts for Lavawall® were:
- Two years after a missing Plex Media Server led to the LastPass breach, the
Remote Monitorign and Management (RMM) tools availabel for Manged IT Service Providers (MSPs)
still didn't monitor for it.
Going through industry-specific applications, we noticed many were missing from the big RMM and patching providers. MSPs, insurance providers, and organizations that put their cleints at risk need to know about these risks, which lead to the largest number of critical audit findings and breaches - After 20 years of writing the same audit findings about system configurations, Payment Card Industry (PCI) compliance, and missing patches, our technical co-founder wanted to make it easier fo avoid these findings
- The existing risk visibility tools for insurance underwriters took a shallow look at Internet-facing risks. They -- along with all businesses -- need a deeper view of the threats that could actually lead to breaches.
Lavawall® breaks vulnerabilities into the following groups:
- Domain risks
- Operating System (OS) patches
- Application patches
- Network vulnerabilities
- Cloud vulnerabilities
- OS configurations
We are currently building more third-party interfaces.
Current interfaces include:
- Axcient*
- Cloudflare
- Connectwise Screen Connect
- Datto RMM
- FreshDesk*
- Huntress
- Microsoft 365
- Panorama9
- ZenDesk
Yes!
You can use your own logo for the console and notifications. You can also use a CNAME to automatically brand your console.
Note: you cannot currently re-proxy the CNAME to Lavawall® through Cloudflare.
You can use your own logo for the console and notifications. You can also use a CNAME to automatically brand your console.
Note: you cannot currently re-proxy the CNAME to Lavawall® through Cloudflare.
Privacy & Security
We encourage primary authentication for Lavawall® through Passkeys or Single Sign On (SSO).
However, we do allow passwords and use passwords as part of the zero-knowledge encryption for your clients' sensitive data, such as Bitlocker keys and Personally-Identifiable Information (PII).
These passwords use Argon2id slow hashes with individual salts and peppers.
However, we do allow passwords and use passwords as part of the zero-knowledge encryption for your clients' sensitive data, such as Bitlocker keys and Personally-Identifiable Information (PII).
These passwords use Argon2id slow hashes with individual salts and peppers.
Yes! Lavawall communicates with its endpoints through TLS. However, given that many of our clients want to be as secure as possible and have
TLS inspection enabled, we allow for "insecure" connections with invalid certificates, which result from such configurations.
We have added an additional secure tunnel that mimics the TLS process within the public TLS tunnel. This extra tunnel provides authentication and privacy for the workstations and the Lavawall® servers to prevent attacks such as the one that took down Solar Winds.
We have added an additional secure tunnel that mimics the TLS process within the public TLS tunnel. This extra tunnel provides authentication and privacy for the workstations and the Lavawall® servers to prevent attacks such as the one that took down Solar Winds.
We do not enable remote access tools like ScreenConnect unless you authorize them
and are logged in. Lavawall® was not vulnerable to the ScreenConnect vulnerability
because we install and uninstall it right before it's used. In addition, we give the option of linking to Access.
Remote access is not enabled for read-only and audit situations.
Remote access is not enabled for read-only and audit situations.
Lavawall®'s designer holds a CISSP and CISA. In addition, we have external and internal security reviews.
Get In Touch
Have a quick question and don't want to talk? Send us a quick note with the form below and we'll reply within one business day.
NW Calgary:
(By Appointment Only)
ThreeShield Information Security Corporation
600 Crowfoot Crescent N.W., Suite 340
Calgary, Alberta
T3G 0B4
ThreeShield Information Security Corporation
600 Crowfoot Crescent N.W., Suite 340
Calgary, Alberta
T3G 0B4
SE Calgary:
(By Appointment Only)
ThreeShield Information Security Corporation
105, 11500 - 29th St. SE
Calgary, Alberta
T2Z 3W9
Canada
ThreeShield Information Security Corporation
105, 11500 - 29th St. SE
Calgary, Alberta
T2Z 3W9
Canada
Phone
Sales Hours:
9:00am to 5:00pm Mountain Time
Support Hours:
7:00am to 7:00pm Mountain Time
On-Call Support Hours:
24/7